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ample, Kazuko Otsu, a high-school teacher, has con-
structed a program to show how the everyday life of her
students relates to that of other people on earth who are
invisible to them through the “window” of the price of
bananas. She first draws the students’ attention to the
fact that most of the bananas they see are labeled by big
enterprises and imported from the Philippines. The
youngsters are motivated to understand why these im-
ported goods are so inexpensive. Then they view slides
of banana plantations in the Philippines to learn how the
plantations damage the people, lands, and forests. They
also learn about the economic systems of production and
circulation of bananas and why the farmers’ share of the
sales is so small. Finally, they are asked what they can
do to protest this damaging economic and environmental
chain. In another example, an elementary-school
teacher, Tamotsu Chiba, has tried to help children un-
derstand “the hamburger connection”—to recognize the
relationship between the increase in beef production and
the decrease in rain forest in South and Central America.
The need to refrain from exploiting common resources
may not be very great in the Reserve, although the forest
is increasingly being burned off even there. In this highly
protected area, the workings of economic and political
systems beyond the individual are not transparent.
Therefore, the indigenous-practice model is individual-
istic as well as cognitive, probably too much so. The
preservation of environmental resources is “naturalized”
in the sense that practices favoring forest regeneration
are naturally led by the rich accumulated knowledge of
ecological complexity and that this knowledge is natu-
rally distributed by observing the practices of more
knowledgeable and respected old-timers. Although this
story seems tenable, the conscious-control model
strongly suggests that this is so only because (1) the
northern Pete´n rain forest is not openly accessible to big
business, (2) no powerful technology has been brought
in, and (3) the economy of the ethnic groups observed in
this study has not yet been integrated into a larger cap-
italistic economy—their life is not driven by a desire to
maximize profit. Human behavior and learning, espe-
cially with regard to resource consumption, have to be
viewed from sociocultural as well as cognitive perspec-
tives, because once selling becomes the purpose of pro-
duction even the learning process changes (Greenfield
1999).
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Atran and associates make it clear that social actors rep-
resenting three groups subsisting in the same habitat in
central Pete´n manifest differences in their behavior, cog-
nition, and relationship relative to their immediate rain-
forest environment. A first round of analysis begins to
reveal these differences in these groups’ agricultural im-
pact on the forest. As successive rounds of sophisticated
analysis of measurements of individual cognitions and
behaviors proceed, the differences harden into a pattern
which appears to leave no room for doubt that the an-
cestrally local Itzaj Maya are the only conscious protec-
tors of the forest. Spanish-speaking immigrants who
have learned their trade from the Itzaj remain close be-
hind them, while the Q’eqchi’, who have only recently
migrated to central Pete´n, are far behind on all counts.
In addition, there is little hope for short-term change in
the Q’eqchi’s (destructive) interaction with the forest be-
cause they neither interact with nor listen to those who
could teach them better.
Clearly, the research and analysis behind this paper
are more innovative and sophisticated than one can ac-
knowledge in as brief a comment as this. I seek rather
to highlight some issues which would likely have
greatest (probably negative) impact upon the people stud-
ied—the Q’eqchi’. In particular, I wish that Atran and
associates would provide more information on the way
in which their research is related to local politics of cul-
ture and development. They describe their work as de-
veloping in near-laboratory conditions, characterized by
both optimal control of variables and maximum disin-
terest of the analysts. Comments on Atran’s (1993) paper
on Itzaj tropical agro-forestry and Hofling’s (1996) report
on the Maya Itzaj struggle for linguistic revitalization
indicate, however, that Atran and associates are not dis-
interested but motivated researchers. This, of course, is
not a problem per se; it is the way anthropology works.
Land tenure and land use are highly politicized issues in
the Pete´n (see Clark 2000, Gru¨nberg 2000, Macz and
Gru¨nberg 1999, Schwartz 1995). Atran and associates are
part of that political situation, and they should have
made that clear or to their readers. A disclaimer in a
previously published version of the paper to the effect
that the authors “aim not to offer moral judgements on
behavior, but grounds for understanding and reconciling
conflicting behaviors” (Atran et al. 1999:7603) may not
be enough.
The data and analysis presented in this article are very
strong. However, on the basis of my own research in the
Maya lowlands and the published research of others 1
question whether the authors have isolated the right set
of factors to explain why the practices of some cultiva-
tors are more environmentally harmful than those of
others. They isolate sociocultural factors (including so-
cial networks and cognitive models) from economic,
demographic, and ecological factors in local actors’ in-
teraction with their environment and make them the
primary target of their research. I see a problem of cal-
ibration in the way in which the key factor of “destruc-
tiveness” is assessed here for agroforestry practice. My
own research in central Quintana Roo indicates that in
order to understand the dynamics of land use and hence
of the “destructiveness” of agroforestry practice we need
to study both the scale and the centrality of milpa ag-
riculture in the (long-term) historical context of house-
hold economies (Hostettler 1996, 2001, 2002). By “scale”
I mean the relative economic importance of milpa ag-
riculture as part of particular diversified household econ-
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omies, and by “centrality” I mean the degree of identi-
fication of producers with milpa agriculture in terms of
“craftsmanship” (i.e., differences in situated practice). In
order to examine “destructiveness” we need to consider
the complex interplay of social, cultural, economic, and
ecological factors (including particularities of market in-
tegration, history of land use, and socioeconomic differ-
ences among and social factors within households) and
find ways to weigh and calibrate them. Otherwise “de-
structiveness” is measured, as in the case of this paper,
on the group-as-a-whole level (a kind of “ethnicized de-
structiveness”), which is methodologically not of the
same order as the authors’ subsequent detailed differ-
ential assessment of “nurturantness” based on the mea-
surement and analysis of individualized behaviors and
cognitions.
Atran and associates conclude that Q’eqchi’ who
moved into central Pete´n around the 1970s seem unable
to adapt to the lowland environment or learn from their
neighbors because of their cultural baggage, which seems
to be suited to highland requirements only (e.g., their
ceremonial attachment to sacred highland mountains
detours access to ecological information relevant to low-
land commons survival). Work by Richard R. Wilk (1991)
and James R. Gregory (1984) indicates, however, that
Q’eqchi’ who moved into southern Belize roughly a cen-
tury earlier along with lowland-trained Mopan seem to
have maintained their highland ceremonial attachment
and survived for so long on Toledo’s poor tropical soils
not because their agriculture could destroy unlimited
amounts of resources over an extended period of time
but because of their intimate understanding of the re-
gional ecology. Is it only time that accounts for these
differences?
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Gil-White suggests that our failure to find any evidence
for systematic residual agreement among the Itza’ may
be something of a “ceiling effect,” with knowledge and
agreement being so high that the only remaining varia-
bility is random variability. This potential problem is
not, we believe, a problem in practice. For example, a
principal-components analysis of interinformant agree-
ment conducted on plant-animal relations for the Itza’
reveals a single-factor solution accounting for 46% of the
variance with a mean first-factor score of .67. In other
words, the average cultural “competence” of our Itza’
informants regarding the consensual “cultural model” is
a long way from a ceiling effect.
Lack of reliable residual agreement among Itza’ elders
does not mean that Itza’ ecological models are not being
transmitted socially. It may be that knowledge flows
from older Itza’ to both Ladinos and younger Itza’. In
ongoing work we are studying ecological models in
younger Itza’ and collecting data on expert and social
networks. We are finding that younger Itza’ see reciprocal
relations between plants and animals but that their con-
sensual knowledge only partially overlaps with that of
their elders. More detailed analysis should reveal
whether the younger Itza’ are learning from their elders
and whether this learning is best described in terms of
abstract notions like reciprocity or in terms of detailed
interactions involving generic species.
Gil-White objects to our characterization of norms as
“rules or principles” that are “functional units of cul-
tural transmission and evolution.” Elsewhere (Gil-White
2001) he has argued that norms functionally mark ethnic
boundaries and, further, that this functional relationship
between norms and ethnicity is a direct product of bi-
ological and cultural evolution. Boyd and Richerson
(2001) have lately reiterated their view of norms as
“shared social rules.” All of us agree that some norms
can also be dysfunctional. Our argument concerning
prestige-bias transmission is that Ladinos learn from
Itza’ not through imitation of norms but through atten-
tion to social deference patterns that point to (and do
not describe) likely sources of relevant observations that
constrain candidates for relevant inferences. To imply
that cultural behaviors (consensual statistical patterns)
relating to people’s views of species relations, rankings
of spirit preferences, and the like, pertain to “norms”
seems to rob the notion of norm of its analytical use-
fulness. This is not to suggest that there are no norms
in the functional sense described above. It is only to deny
them an exclusive or primary role in cultural transmis-
sion, formation, and evolution.
In principle, there is nothing in Boyd and Richerson’s
approach (or Henrich and Gil-White’s) that requires
norms to be discrete units acquired through imitation-
copying, although the mathematical models they have
preferred in the past do sometimes use these simplifying
assumptions. At other times they suggest that social
learning is indeed based on inferential capacities influ-
enced by “cognitive biases” (Boyd and Richerson 1985:
70–71) and, more recently, that “mental representations
are not replicated, but rather are ‘reconstructed’ through
an inferential process that is strongly affected by cog-
nitive attractors” (Henrich and Boyd n.d.; cf. Sperber
1996). Attention to such cognitive processes has been
scarce in the past, but more recent work is encouraging.
Examples include Gil-White’s (2001) cross-cultural in-
vestigation of the inferential underpinnings of essen-
tialism in the formation of ethnicity (cf. Hirschfeld 1996)
and Henrich and Boyd’s (n.d.) modeling of the ways in
which cognitive attractors shape the social learning pro-
cess (e.g., with variable or otherwise noisy new infor-
mation “snapped” back or forward by cognitive modules
to reduce noise and facilitate mnemonic retention, social
transmission, and cultural survival of the information).
It appears that some of our disagreements have to do
more with matters of word meaning than with matters
of fact. We think that ordinary use of terms like “norm”
and “imitation” (in political science, anthropology, so-
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